chroot

chroot(2)                      System Calls Manual                     chroot(2)

NAME
       chroot - change root directory

LIBRARY
       Standard C library (libc, -lc)

SYNOPSIS
       #include <unistd.h>

       int chroot(const char *path);

   Feature Test Macro Requirements for glibc (see feature_test_macros(7)):

       chroot():
           Since glibc 2.2.2:
               _XOPEN_SOURCE && ! (_POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200112L)
                   || /* Since glibc 2.20: */ _DEFAULT_SOURCE
                   || /* glibc <= 2.19: */ _BSD_SOURCE
           Before glibc 2.2.2:
               none

DESCRIPTION
       chroot() changes the root directory of the calling process to that
       specified in path.  This directory will be used for pathnames beginning
       with /.  The root directory is inherited by all children of the calling
       process.

       Only a privileged process (Linux: one with the CAP_SYS_CHROOT capability
       in its user namespace) may call chroot().

       This call changes an ingredient in the pathname resolution process and
       does nothing else.  In particular, it is not intended to be used for any
       kind of security purpose, neither to fully sandbox a process nor to
       restrict filesystem system calls.  In the past, chroot() has been used by
       daemons to restrict themselves prior to passing paths supplied by
       untrusted users to system calls such as open(2).  However, if a folder is
       moved out of the chroot directory, an attacker can exploit that to get
       out of the chroot directory as well.  The easiest way to do that is to
       chdir(2) to the to-be-moved directory, wait for it to be moved out, then
       open a path like ../../../etc/passwd.

       A slightly trickier variation also works under some circumstances if
       chdir(2) is not permitted.  If a daemon allows a "chroot directory" to be
       specified, that usually means that if you want to prevent remote users
       from accessing files outside the chroot directory, you must ensure that
       folders are never moved out of it.

       This call does not change the current working directory, so that after
       the call '.' can be outside the tree rooted at '/'.  In particular, the
       superuser can escape from a "chroot jail" by doing:

           mkdir foo;
           chroot foo;
           cd ..;

       This call does not close open file descriptors, and such file descriptors
       may allow access to files outside the chroot tree.

RETURN VALUE
       On success, zero is returned.  On error, -1 is returned, and errno is set
       to indicate the error.

ERRORS
       Depending on the filesystem, other errors can be returned.  The more
       general errors are listed below:

       EACCES Search permission is denied on a component of the path prefix.
              (See also path_resolution(7).)

       EFAULT path points outside your accessible address space.

       EIO    An I/O error occurred.

       ELOOP  Too many symbolic links were encountered in resolving path.

       ENAMETOOLONG
              path is too long.

       ENOENT The file does not exist.

       ENOMEM Insufficient kernel memory was available.

       ENOTDIR
              A component of path is not a directory.

       EPERM  The caller has insufficient privilege.

STANDARDS
       None.

HISTORY
       SVr4, 4.4BSD, SUSv1 (marked TO BE WITHDRAWN), SUSv2 (marked LEGACY).
       This function is not part of POSIX.1-2001.

NOTES
       A child process created via fork(2) inherits its parent's root directory.
       The root directory is left unchanged by execve(2).

       The magic symbolic link, /proc/pid/root, can be used to discover a
       process's root directory; see proc(5) for details.

       FreeBSD has a stronger jail() system call.

SEE ALSO
       chroot(1), chdir(2), pivot_root(2), path_resolution(7), switch_root(8)

Linux man-pages 6.17               2026-02-08                          chroot(2)